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What should be done with the revenues from a carbon cap
and auction system? Robert Costanza and Joshua Farley
Many people believe that a carbon cap and
auction system will only prove politically
feasible if all individuals share ALL generated
revenues equally. An alternative is to return
some fraction of the annual revenues as
dividends, but to use the remainder for other
purposes related to preserving and enhancing
the common asset—the atmosphere and
climate. Certainly, revenue should cover the
administration costs of the system, but a
significant fraction should pay for related
projects like researching and developing
renewable energy, deploying renewable
energy technologies in developing countries,
paying for ecosystem services like carbon
sequestration, etc. Few deny that all of these
things are important, but many still argue
that these investments would either happen
through the new market signals the system
would produce or should come from other
sources of public funding. Here are three
reasons why an atmospheric trust should use
a significant fraction of the revenues (net of
administrative costs) for purposes related
directly to “enhancing the asset” rather than
pay out as current dividends:

1. What are “dividends,” in this case?
Dividends imply the net proceeds
produced by the capital after subtracting
all transaction and other costs. Dividends
should be paid from net profits without
touching the capital asset. In order to
maintain the atmospheric asset, humans
need to cut emissions drastically and that
will require both the development and
deployment of low carbon technologies at
a very rapid rate. Can we expect private
markets to do this alone, even with the
price signals adjusted by the carbon auction
price? If research and development is left
up to the private sector, new technologies
will be patented. Patents are simply legal
monopolies, and monopoly prices will ration
use of new technologies to those who
can afford them. Since information is not
depleted through use, price rationing due
to patents creates artificial scarcity. If the

resulting prices are too high, China and India
are likely to continue burning coal, in which
case, we could not achieve atmospheric
carbon stocks of 350 parts per million, even
if the US reduced emissions to zero. Patents
expire in 20 years, but that may be too late.
Therefore, some amount of direct investment
by the trust would be necessary to restore
and maintain the asset at the required rate.
For example, if research and development
receives a share of revenues to create
carbon neutral energy technologies made
freely available to all, it could dramatically
trim the costs of reducing carbon emissions.
Not only would this make it easier to tighten
caps in the US, but other nations would also
be more likely to adopt these technologies
and reduce their own emissions. The
question really boils down to this: who is
best placed to develop and disseminate the
necessary technologies—the private sector
or the trust? There are advantages and
disadvantages to both. Hedging our bets by
allowing a significant role for both would
be best at this point. These investments
should be monitored closely. The trust can
then adjust the fraction of the revenues that
is devoted to direct investment, based on
the relative effectiveness of its investments
compared to those of the private sector.

2. Who are the shareholders?
The shareholders in the atmospheric
commons are both the current generation and
future generations. If the government returned
all the revenues as dividends to only the
current generation, does that leave enough for
future generations? One could argue that it is
the asset itself that the present inhabitants
need to bequest to future generations; the
carbon cap and auction system (through
the higher prices on carbon emissions it
will produce) will allow the restoration and
maintenance of the asset. This comes back to
the question whether or not the price signals
alone will get the job done fast enough.
There is a strong possibility that they will
need some help. In any case, by making the

fraction of the revenues returned as dividends
a variable rather than fixed at 100%, one
could monitor the effectiveness of the private
market in getting the job done and adjust the
percentage returned as dividends accordingly
over time.

3. What are the dividends spent on?
In essence, the trust is charging for the
depletion of a common asset. If revenues are
returned to private individuals, they will likely
spend them on private goods and services, yet
the production of these is the root cause of
the carbon emissions that damage the asset
in the first place. Making the cap global, or
extending it to carbon emissions generated
by all imports, would partially address this
issue but presents its own political feasibility
problems. It makes sense that at least
some of the revenues from depletion of this
common asset be spent on public, rather than
private, goods and services aimed directly at
restoring and maintaining the asset. Again,
there would be room to adjust this percentage
based on performance.
In summary, all these reasons boil down
to one question: how effective would the
private market alone be at reducing carbon
emissions over time? If the cap is set and
enforced adequately, then it will not be
possible to exceed it. There is certainly truth
to this, but there will be significant effects
on the price of fossil fuel. With no technical
change, the price will shoot up. If technical
change is rapid enough, the price would
rise less and might even be stable, even
as caps are tightened. Direct investment
by the trust would help speed technical
change, because it would produce public
domain technologies that would be more
quickly adopted, and this would moderate
the price rise. Predicting the magnitude
of these effects is very difficult. It makes
sense to allow the fraction returned to be
variable, to make the system more adaptive
and effective without affecting the political
feasibility of the system.
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